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Predictions from perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995, 2005) regarding object recognition across the same
or different viewpoints were tested. Results showed that high perceptual load reduces distracter
recognition levels despite always presenting distracter objects from the same view. They also
showed that the levels of distracter recognition were unaffected by a change in the distracter object
view under conditions of low perceptual load. These results were found both with repetition priming
measures of distracter recognition and with performance on a surprise recognition memory test. The
results support load theory proposals that distracter recognition critically depends on the level of
perceptual load. The implications for the role of attention in object recognition theories are
discussed.
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The role of attention in object recognition has been debated
among attention researchers ever since the start of attention re-
search. In Broadbent’s (1958) pioneering model of attention per-
ceptual processes leading to object recognition require focused
attention. Attentional selection occurs early on, following only
rudimentary processes of sensory registration (see also Treisman,
1969). Numerous reports of failures to recognize unattended ob-
jects provided support for this model (e.g., Neisser & Becklen,
1975; Rock & Guttman, 1981; Treisman & Geffen, 1967).
The opposing late selection view, in which object recognition is
an automatic preattentive process (e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963;
Tipper, 1985) has also received much empirical support. Various
studies have demonstrated that unattended objects are in fact
recognized as shown by effects such as response competition and
negative priming (e.g., Gatti & Egeth, 1978; Driver & Tipper,
1989). The accumulation of evidence for both of these conflicting
early and late selection views of attention, sometimes within the
very same task (e.g., compare Farcnoloni & Egeth, 1980 with
Driver & Tipper, 1989), has fueled an ongoing debate over four
decades of research.
The Perceptual Load Theory
A resolution to this debate has been offered within a hybrid
perceptual load model (Lavie, 1995, 2000; Lavie, Hirst, De Fock-
ert, & Viding, 2004). According to this model, object perception
and recognition depend on the allocation of attention but several of
the previous assumptions about attention and perception have to be
reconsidered. First, both of the early selection and late selection
views were framed within a structural approach to information
processing. In this approach, attentional limits are conceived in
terms of a rather rigid “bottleneck” that is placed either early or
late in a fixed information processing sequence. The Perceptual
Load model has applied a capacity approach (e.g., Kahneman,
1973; Navon, 1984) to the debate. In this approach, capacity limits
cannot be described as an all-or-none bottleneck that can only
allow for the recognition of one object at a time (c.f., Broadbent,
1958). Rather, several objects can be recognized before perception
gets overloaded. Capacity limits can thus be reached either early or
late in the processing, depending on the level of perceptual load in
the task.
Second, attention should not be confused with intention: the
instruction to ignore task-irrelevant distracter objects may not
always be sufficient to render these objects unattended. According
to the load model, the allocation of attention is an automatic
process in the sense that it cannot be simply withheld at will
because of the instruction to ignore task-irrelevant objects.
Therefore, it follows that the level of perceptual load in any
given task determines whether task-irrelevant objects can be suc-
cessfully ignored. In tasks that involve only low perceptual load,
spare capacity from task-relevant processing will unintentionally
spill over to the perception of task-irrelevant objects (producing
late selection). Task-irrelevant objects will not be recognized,
however, when the current task requires full perceptual capacity in
situations of high perceptual load, leaving no capacity available to
spill over to task-irrelevant processing (producing early selection).
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Although currently there is no agreement on a mathematical
formula that can offer precise quantification of information load,
there are clear and well-established operational definitions for
perceptual load. Perceptual load has been operationally defined
either in terms of the number of different items in a perceptual
recognition task (a greater number of items involves a higher
perceptual load) or in terms of the number and complexity of
perceptual operations that the task involves (e.g., a feature detec-
tion task involves less perceptual load than a feature conjunction
discrimination task, e.g., Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & Lavie,
2008; Lavie, 1995; Schwartz et al., 2005; see also Lavie, 1995;
Lavie & Tsal, 1994, for a more detailed discussion, and Lavie &
De Fockert, 2003, for distinguishing perceptual load from manip-
ulations of general task difficulty).
Support for the perceptual load model has been provided in
numerous studies that have used either type of load manipulation
(see Lavie, 2005, 2006; Macdonald & Lavie, 2008, for recent
reviews). These have found that increasing the level of perceptual
load in task-relevant processing significantly reduces the extent to
which task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, either consciously
(e.g., Carmel, Rees, & Lavie, 2007; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie,
2006; Lavie, 2006; Macdonald & Lavie, 2008), or even uncon-
sciously (e.g., Bahrami et al., 2008). They have also shown that
increased perceptual load reduces the extent to which task-
irrelevant stimuli produce behavioral interference effects (e.g.,
Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000; see also
Forster & Lavie, 2007, 2008, for generalization of these effects
across both different types of distracters and individual differences
in distractibility).
Imaging studies have also provided support for the load theory
in showing that the level of perceptual load determines the level of
visual cortex activity related to the presence of various task-
irrelevant stimuli. Such stimuli include meaningless checkerboards
patterns, moving dots, meaningful pictures of objects (O’Connor,
Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner, 2002; Pinsk, Doniger, & Kastner, 2003;
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997; Schwartz et al., 2005; Yi et al., 2004)
and even invisible images (e.g., Bahrami, Rees, & Lavie, 2007).
This behavioral and imaging research convincingly demon-
strates the role of perceptual load in determining distracter pro-
cessing, from early unconscious processing (mediated by retino-
topic processing in primary visual cortex) to distracter interference
on performance and intrusions into conscious awareness. This line
of research thus provides much evidence for the resolution of the
early and selection debate offered by the perceptual load theory.
With respect to the role of attention in object recognition, the
question at the heart of this debate, load theory suggests that
distracter object recognition should depend on the level of percep-
tual load in the attended task. Some of the previous studies have
generalized the effects of perceptual load to measures of behav-
ioral interference effects and brain activity related to meaningful
distracter objects (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2008; Lavie, Ro, &
Russell, 2003; Lavie, 2006; Pinsk et al, 2003; Yi et al., 2004).
However, these studies have used a small set of distracter objects
that were repeated many times throughout the experiment. Such a
procedure cannot reveal whether a meaningful distracter object
could be recognized upon its first presentation. In addition, the
previous research did not yet directly relate load theory to object
recognition theory. This was the overall aim of the present study.
Relating Perceptual Load Theory to Object Recognition
Research in object recognition (see e.g., Biederman, 2001;
Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; Peissig & Tarr, 2007) is tradition-
ally concerned with the nature of the object representations that are
formed. Specifically, this research investigates whether the repre-
sentation is 2D view dependent (e.g., representation of a car just as
seen from its back) or 3D view invariant, allowing one to recog-
nize an object independent of its presentation view (e.g., recogni-
tion of an object as a car regardless of whether it is seen from the
front or the back). Previous research has not yet considered how
these important principles of object recognition are affected by the
level of perceptual load.
Thus, in the present study, we examined the effects of percep-
tual load on object recognition while considering the nature of the
distracter object representations (specifically whether these are
view dependent or view independent). Recall that perceptual load
theory adopts a capacity approach, in which all perceptual pro-
cessing (not just advanced stages, e.g., those that allow for explicit
representations) has limited capacity. High perceptual load can
significantly modulate very basic perceptual processing (such as
detection sensitivity for a light flicker; Carmel et al., 2007) or for
stimulus presence (vs. absence; Macdonald & Lavie, 2008), as
well as the associated activity in primary visual cortex, and under
some conditions even the lateral geniculate nucleus (O’Connor, et
al., 2002). This capacity approach and supportive findings led us to
predict that high perceptual load would reduce recognition levels
even when the distracter objects were always presented in the same
view. Although object repetition in the same view allows for
recognition based on more rudimentary, view-dependent represen-
tations the previous findings suggest that perceptual load can
reduce the extent to which such rudimentary representations are
formed. On the other hand, in conditions of low perceptual load we
predicted that distracter objects would be recognized even when
presented in different views. “Spill-over” of attentional capacity in
tasks of low perceptual load should result in view-invariant rep-
resentations of the distracter objects.
Interestingly, somewhat different predictions can be derived
from one of the most detailed object recognition models, the
hybrid object recognition model (Hummel, 2001; Hummel &
Stankiewicz, 1996), which considers the role of attention in object
recognition but suggests that it has a more restricted role. Hummel
and colleagues suggest that attention is only needed to form
“analytic” object representations that involve structural, view-
invariant description of the spatial relations of object parts. View-
dependent, “holistic” representations, however, are preattentive. In
contrast with the perceptual load theory, the hybrid object recog-
nition model implies that distracter object recognition would re-
main unaffected by the level of perceptual load in the task when
the distracter objects are always repeated in the same view. We
tested these contrasting predictions both for short-term recognition
(over a period of a few seconds, Experiments 1–3) and for long-
term recognition (over a period of several minutes, Experiment 5).
In addition, in Experiments 4 through 5b we also tested the
prediction derived from load theory that the spillover of attention
in conditions of low perceptual load would allow for full repre-
sentations of the irrelevant distracter objects, including their 3D
structural descriptions. This would result in distracter object rec-
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ognition being viewpoint-independent in tasks with low perceptual
load.
These predictions appear to contrast with the overall claim of
the hybrid object recognition model that structural descriptions
cannot be formed for unattended objects. The object recognition
model does not distinguish between unattended processing under
conditions of low or high perceptual load. However, according to
the load theory of attention, supposedly unattended distracter ob-
jects are only truly unattended in conditions of high perceptual
load.
So far, the role proposed for attention in object recognition in
the hybrid object recognition model received empirical support in
studies measuring object recognition with a an object-naming
repetition-priming paradigm in which attention was manipulated
through spatial cuing (Stankiewicz, Hummel, & Cooper, 1998;
Thoma & Davidoff, 2004). We discuss these studies in greater
detail later on (in the Results & Discussion of Experiment 4a); for
now we just briefly mention that these studies have not varied the
level of perceptual load and so neither body of previous studies
(those that have addressed perceptual load or those that have
addressed the role of attention in object recognition) have exam-
ined the effects of perceptual load on explicit object recognition
across the same or different viewpoints. This was the purpose of
the present study. In Experiments 1 through 4, we measured
recognition using a repetition-priming paradigm. In Experiment 5,
we measured recognition with a surprise recognition memory test
that followed exposure to distracter objects during performance of
an attentional task in which we varied the level of perceptual load.
Experiment 1
An object-naming repetition priming task was used. Subjects
were asked to name familiar target objects presented in pairs of
prime and probe displays. Object recognition was measured
through the facilitation effects in naming of the probe target when
this was presented in the prime. A wide range of familiar objects
from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) list was used. Each
object was presented only once as a target.
This task was modified so that the level of perceptual load in the
prime displays could be varied. Whereas the probe target objects
always appeared at fixation the prime task involved visual search.
Subjects were required to search for the target object in the prime
display in one of three central positions: at fixation, and above or
below fixation. Perceptual load was manipulated in the prime
search task by varying the relevant search set size (e.g., Lavie,
1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997).
In the low perceptual load condition, the target object ap-
peared among two place holders (circles). In high perceptual
load condition, the target appeared among two meaningless
nontarget objects (created by scrambling the features of familiar
objects). Figure 1 presents an example high perceptual load
trial. Meaningless (rather than meaningful) nontarget objects
were used so that increased perceptual load would not also
involve increased load on naming. A control experiment estab-
lished that our scrambling procedure was successful in prevent-
ing recognition and naming of the nontarget objects (see the
Method section for details).
In addition, each of the prime displays contained a meaningful
task-irrelevant distracter object on the left or right that subjects
were asked to ignore. The irrelevant distracter object was either
repeated as the target of the following probe display (on one third
of the trials) or not repeated (on another third of the trials) and on
another third of the trials, the prime target object was repeated as
the probe target. Whenever an object was repeated, it was repeated
in the same view as that presented in the prime.
Figure 1. An example of a high-load trial in Experiment 1. Note that the target could appear in any of the three
central column positions. In the low-load conditions, the nontarget scrambled objects were replaced with circular
place holders.
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As we previously discussed, the perceptual load theory predicts
that repetition priming effects for the distracter objects should be
significantly reduced in the high (compared to the low) perceptual
load conditions. By contrast, the hybrid object recognition model
(e.g., Hummel, 2001) predicts that repetition priming for ignored
distracter objects that are repeated in the same view should remain
unaffected by the level of perceptual load in the task (because the
more rudimentary, view-based, object representations are preatten-
tive). Repeated target objects, however, should be fully attended
under both conditions of load. Thus, both the perceptual load
theory and the hybrid object recognition model predict equivalent
priming for target objects across conditions of load.
Method
Participants. Twenty-one members of the participant pool of
the Department of Psychology, University College London, took
part in the experiment. They were paid £3 to participate. All were
native English speakers and had normal or fully corrected vision.
Three subjects were excluded because of overall error rates of over
33%. The analysis of results was based on the remaining 18
participants (3 male) whose age ranged between 18 and 53 years.
Stimuli. Black and white line drawings of objects from the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set were displayed on a 15-inch
PC monitor. Participants sat approximately 90 cm from the dis-
play. All images were standardized in size such that they sub-
tended 1.6° of visual angle (2.5 cm) along their main axis of
elongation (i.e., horizontal or vertical). A random-line pattern
mask that covered the whole screen (15.6° of visual angle, 24.5
cm) was presented following prime displays and a smaller random-
line pattern mask (4.6°  3.45°, 7.2 cm  3.45 cm) was presented
at the screen center following probe displays. An outline circle
(0.25° / 0.4 cm) was presented before each trial. Fixation was
indicated with a cross (0.25° / 0.4 cm).
A prime display consisted of a target object that appeared either
at fixation, above fixation, or below fixation (with its center 1.75°
[2.75 cm] from fixation) and nontargets that appeared at the two
locations not occupied by the target. The nontarget objects were
either scrambled nonobjects (high load) or simple circles (low
load) of the same size. An additional distracter object was pre-
sented to the left or the right of fixation (with its center 2.25° [3.5
cm] from fixation). The probe display consisted of a single object
shown at the center of the screen. The probe object was equally
likely to be either the same as the prime-target or the same as the
prime-distracter or a new image.
Target location (3) and distracter location (2) were counterbal-
anced for each of the three repetition condition (target repeated,
distracter repeated, or no object repeated). The 18 variations of
prime-probe trial-pairs were shown twice in each block resulting in
36 trial-pairs (72 trials in total) in each block. Each of the partic-
ular objects appeared only in one prime-probe pair throughout the
experiment.
The repeated objects were drawn from six subsets of 12 objects
each, which were presented as probes (72 objects for 72 trials).
These six subsets were counterbalanced across subjects so that
each object appeared in a particular condition (repeated attended,
repeated distracter, and unrepeated, for high and low load) equally
often as a probe. The unrepeated image (i.e., the image in the
prime display that was not displayed as a probe) was randomly
selected from a different set of 96 images. Each of the unrepeated
objects appeared in only one trial-pair.
A third set of 60 objects was used to produce scrambled objects
for the nontarget objects in the high-load condition. The scrambled
objects were created by first rotating an object and then using a
filter (PluginCommander 2.0) in Adobe Photoshop 6.0 that divided
the image into four quadrants, then “flipped” and reshuffled these
quadrants vertically or horizontally. In some cases, this manipu-
lation did not form a coherent object (because not all flipped
quadrants appeared connected to each other). These quadrants
were then manually moved to form a coherent object. To ensure
that the scrambled objects did not afford naming based on their
parts, we asked 7 new participants to name the scrambled objects.
Even though these objects were now at the center of attention and
presented at fixation (rather than unpredictably in one of three
locations) and the participants were given 3 s to name these
objects, they were only able to name 15% of these objects on
average (SE  3.85). In contrast, 97% of the intact objects on
average (SE  1.1) were named correctly under these more opti-
mal conditions.
Procedure. The participants were instructed to name the target
objects on the prime and probe as quickly and accurately as
possible and ignore the distracter object on the prime. Naming
latencies for target and probe objects were collected using E-Prime
1.0 (PST) with a dynamic trigger microphone attached to a re-
sponse box.
An outline circle was presented before each trial. Subjects
initiated each trial by pressing the space bar. A fixation cross was
then presented at the display center for 500 ms, followed by a
blank white screen presented for 30 ms and a prime display shown
for 500 ms. The prime display was replaced with a 500-ms mask
display, followed by a blank screen displayed for 2,000 ms. Sub-
jects were requested to respond to the prime object as soon as they
could recognize it and this procedure provided them 3 s to make
their naming response. Following the 2-s blank screen a probe
image was shown in the center of the screen for 170 ms, followed
by a 500-ms mask. Subjects were also requested to respond to the
probe object as soon as they could recognize it and were provided
with 3 s to make their probe naming response. After the probe
response, or a waiting period of 3,000 ms, the computer displayed
the names of the target and the probe object, as well as the probe
response time (collected from the onset of the probe display). This
marked the end of each trial-pair, at which stage the experimenter
used the keyboard to record the participant’s accuracy as well as
voice key errors (i.e., when the voice key triggered erroneously).
The participant could then initiate the next trial with a key press.
Each subject completed one low-load block and one high-load
block, each preceded by a block of 16 example trials using a set of
objects different from the experimental set. The order of low- and
high-load blocks was counterbalanced between subjects. The or-
dering of trials within a block was randomized for each subject, as
was the pairing of target and distracter objects on prime trials.
Results
Trial pairs with a voice key error (M 3%) were excluded from
all analyses.
Prime responses. One-way within-subject analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVAs) were conducted on the correct prime RTs and
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error rates with the factor of load (low, high). These ANOVAs
showed a main effect on the prime RTs, F(1, 17) 25.8, p .001,
MSE  4,792, and on the prime error rates, F(1, 17)  68.8, p 
.001, MSE  4.2. The mean prime RT was 867 ms under low load
(M error rate  1 %) and 985 ms (M error rate  17%) under high
load. Thus, load was effectively manipulated in the target process-
ing of the prime display, with poorer performance under high load.
Probe responses. Only probe responses that followed a correct
prime response were entered into analysis in all the experiments
reported. For the RT analysis, incorrect probe trials (M  5%)
were excluded as well. Thus, 14% of the trial-pairs were removed
from the probe RT analysis (Table 1).1
To examine whether perceptual load of the prime had affected
the baseline RTs in the probe we compared the mean baseline RTs
in the unrepeated conditions.2 The mean baseline RT was 827 ms
in the low-load condition and 845 ms in the high-load condition, a
nonsignificant difference, t(17)  1. Priming was calculated for
each participant by subtracting the participant’s mean RT in the
repeated conditions (target or distracter) from their mean RT in the
baseline conditions in each of the load conditions.
Figure 2 presents the priming results. A two-way within-subject
ANOVA on the priming effects as a function of the repetition
object (target, distracter) and load (high, low) revealed a main
effect for the repetition object, F(1, 17) 120.1, p .001, MSE
6,264. The overall level of priming was higher for repeated target
objects than for repeated distracter objects. This is expected be-
cause of the contribution of response repetition to the priming
effects found for the targets (that are repeatedly responded to when
primed) but not for the distracters (that are only named when
presented as probe targets). There was no main effect for load, F(1,
17)  2.1, p  .16, MSE  23,382, but, critically, there was an
interaction between load and repetition object, F(1, 17) 4.8, p
.05, MSE 4,810. As can be seen in Figure 2 although priming for
repeated targets was unaffected by load (F  1), priming for
repeated distracters was significantly reduced by high load, F(1,
17)  4.22, p  .05, MSE  69,301.
Paired t tests of primed (target or distracter repeated) versus
baseline RT in each of the load conditions confirmed that priming
by repeated target objects was significant in both the high-load,
t(17)  10.5, p  .001 and the low-load, t(17)  8.6, p  .001
conditions, whereas priming by repeated distracter objects was
only significant in the low-load conditions (t(17) 3.4, p  .01)
but not in the high-load condition (t  1).
The probe error rates were low and equivalent analyses to those
run on the RT were therefore conducted using nonparametric tests.
These showed no significant effects (all ps  .10), thus establish-
ing that there was no speed-accuracy tradeoff.
The present results provide initial support for our prediction that
increased perceptual load would significantly reduce recognition
of distracter objects even when they are repeated in the same view.
The reduction, indeed elimination, of distracter repetition priming
effects with increased load suggests that engaging attention in a
task of high perceptual load reduces the extent to which rudimen-
tary, view-dependent representations of distracter objects are
formed, and hence reduces the level of distracter recognition even
when the distracter objects are repeated in the same view. Exper-
iment 2 seeks to generalize this finding over a different manipu-
lation of perceptual load.
In addition, the findings that repetition priming effects were
reduced with high load only for distracters but not for targets allow
us to rule out alternative accounts for the effect of load in terms of
a general change in the processing priorities or strategies. A
general change in the processing strategy with load (e.g., reverting
to a more local part-based processing under conditions of high
perceptual load)3 should result in reduced repetition priming ef-
fects from both the distracter and the targets. Other alternative
accounts that attribute the effects of perceptual load to a higher
priority given to targets over distracters with high (vs. low) load
1 To ensure that the results were not somehow because of the higher
number of trials excluded in the high load condition, we ran an additional
analysis of the probe RT results with the incorrect prime and probe
responses included. This showed the same pattern of results (reduced
repetition priming by the distracters under high [vs. low] load) as that
shown by the analysis of the RT for the correct responses only.
2 We note that the main effect of load on the RTs can only be adequately
assessed in the unrepeated baseline conditions. The RTs in the repeated
trials are affected by repetition priming effects and as such preclude a clear
assessment of the effects of load per se.
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative
account.
Figure 2. Experiment 1 results. Means and Standard errors for priming
(baseline RT minus repeated objects RTs) effects as a function of load and
repetition object (n  18).
Table 1
Experiment 1: Mean Response Time (ms), Standard Errors, and
Percentage Errors for Performance in the Probe Displays as a
Function of Prime Load and Repetition Conditions
Prime load
Repetition condition
TR DR NR
Low
M 588 757 828
SE 15 27 34
Percent error 2 7 5
High
M 622 862 846
SE 22 28 27
Percent error 5 4 6
Note. TR  target repeated; DR  distracter repeated; NR  not re-
peated.
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(e.g., Torralbo & Beck, 2008) are also ruled out. In such accounts
target repetition priming effects should be reduced in the low-load
conditions where the attentional bias to targets is not as strong.
In contrast, our finding that high perceptual load reduced dis-
tracter—but not target—recognition is exactly as we predicted
from our claim that distracter recognition depends on the extent to
which task-relevant processing leaves any spare capacity.
Strategy-based accounts for the effects of perceptual load are
further addressed in Experiment 3.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we increased perceptual load by increasing the
number of relevant stimuli. As discussed in the General Introduc-
tion, perceptual load can also be varied by changing the perceptual
processing requirements for the same number of task objects (see
Lavie, 2005 for a review). For the sake of generality in Experiment
2, we varied the processing requirements in the task without
altering the number of objects.
For this purpose, we manipulated perceptual load in Experiment
2 by presenting the target of the prime display either in a familiar
(upright) orientation (low-load condition) or in an unfamiliar
(upside-down) orientation (high-load condition). In all other re-
spects, the displays in Experiment 2 were very similar to those
used in the low-load conditions of Experiment 1. Note in particular
that only the orientation of the target objects in the prime displays
was varied, whereas both of the objects presented as the prime
distracter and the probe target remained in their upright position
across the load conditions. The manipulation of load by flipping
the target object around its horizontal axis was inspired by numer-
ous findings of reduced efficiency of object recognition for objects
in unfamiliar orientation (e.g., McMullen & Jolicoeur, 1990, 1992;
Murray, 1995a, 1995b, 1998, 1999; Murray, Jolicoeur, McMullen,
& Ingleton, 1993).
As before, the perceptual load theory and the hybrid object
recognition theory lead to contrasting predictions. Repetition prim-
ing effects produced by distracter objects that are repeated in the
same view are expected to remain unaffected by the level of
perceptual load in the task according to the hybrid object recog-
nition model. In contrast, according to the load theory, high per-
ceptual load is expected to reduce even rudimentary view-based
distracter representations. Therefore, we predicted that repetition
priming effects would be reduced even for distracters that are
repeated in the same view.
Method
Participants. Seventeen members from the participant pool of
the Department of Psychology, University of London, were re-
cruited for the experiment. They were paid £3 to participate. All
were native English speakers and had normal or fully corrected
vision. One subject was excluded because of a voice key malfunc-
tion. The analysis of results was based on the remaining 16
participants (7 male) whose age ranged between 18 and 32 years.
Stimuli and procedure. The apparatus was the same as in
Experiment 1. The stimuli were similar to those of the low per-
ceptual load condition in Experiment 1, except that for the target
stimuli only objects from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980)
list that had a single familiar upright orientation (e.g., a car) were
used. For example, tools (e.g., a hammer) or some music instru-
ments (e.g., trumpet) were not used as they are familiar in multiple
viewpoints (Vannucci & Viggiano, 2000). Target location (3) and
distracter location (2) were counterbalanced for each of the two
repetition condition (distracter repeated vs. not repeated). The 12
variations of prime-probe trial-pairs were shown three times in
each block producing 36 trial-pairs (72 trials in total) in each
block.
As in Experiment 1, an object appeared in only one trial-pair for
any given participant. There were 72 objects used as probe-targets
and 72 different objects used as prime targets. Probe and target
objects were counterbalanced across participants such that each
object appeared in each condition equally often. Distracter objects
in the unrepeated condition were randomly selected from a set of
36 objects. The procedure of Experiment 2 was the same as
Experiment 1 with two exceptions: (1) there were no trials in
which targets were repeated, and (2) perceptual load was manip-
ulated by presenting the target object in the prime display either
right-way up (low load) or upside-down (high load). Both the
prime distracter and the probe target remained in their upright
position across the load conditions. The ordering of the 36 trial-
pairs in each block and the pairing of repeated and unrepeated
objects on prime trials were randomized for each participant.
Results
Trial pairs with a voice key error (M 3%) were excluded from
all analyses in this experiment. One-way within-subject ANOVAs
on the correct prime RTs and error rates with the factor of load
showed a main effect on the prime RTs, F(1, 15)  26.10, p 
.001, MSE  3,475, and on the prime errors, F(1, 15)  6.57, p 
.01, MSE 0.59 . The mean prime RT was 949 ms under low load
(M error rate  4.7 %) and 1,056 ms (M error rate  9.7 %) under
high load. Thus, load was again effectively manipulated.
Probe responses. Table 2 shows the results for the probe
responses. Incorrect probe trials (M 4%) were excluded from the
RT analyses. Thus, 12.7% of trial-pairs were removed from the RT
analysis. As can be seen in Table 2, the mean baseline RT was 823
ms in the low-load condition and 799 ms in the high-load condi-
tions, a nonsignificant difference, t(15)  1.
Table 2
Experiment 2: Mean Response Time (ms), Standard Errors, and
Percentage Errors for Performance in the Probe Displays as a
Function of Prime Load and Distracter Conditions
Prime load
Distracter condition
DR NR
Low
M 772 823
SE 22 36
Percent error 5 4
High
M 809 799
SE 23 20
Percent error 5 3
Note. DR  distracter repeated; NR  not repeated.
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A two-way within-subject ANOVA of the RTs with the factors
of distracter repetition (repeated vs. unrepeated) and load (high vs.
low) revealed no effects of distracter repetition, F(1, 15)  1.3,
MSE  5,183, p  .28, or load, F(1, 15)  1, MSE  6,753, p 
.75. Importantly, there was a significant interaction, F(1, 15) 
5.2, MSE  2,888, p  .04. The pattern revealed by this inter-
action was as predicted by the load theory: repetition priming
from the ignored objects was only found in the low-load con-
dition, t(15)  2.1, p  .05, but was eliminated in the high-load
condition, t(15)  1. A Friedman ANOVA on the low error
frequencies between all four condition was not significant, 2(3)
1.28, p  .73, thus establishing that there was no speed-accuracy
tradeoff.
These results provide further support for the hypothesis that
high perceptual load in the task modulates the extent to which
distracter objects can be recognized even when they are repeated in
the same view across the prime and probe. In contrast with
previous claims that view-dependent object recognition does not
require attention (e.g., Stankiewicz et al., 1998), this experiment
demonstrates that recognition of distracter objects repeated in the
same view does depend on a spill-over of attention (see also
Experiments 4 and 5).
Note that in this experiment perceptual load was increased for
the same number of objects in the prime display. This manip-
ulation of load allows us to rule out alternative accounts in
terms of any specific factor associated with increased number of
objects in high load (e.g., specific cross talk in binding parts
into objects, e.g., Hummel, 2001) rather than availability of
attentional capacity.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we sought to further generalize the effects of
load on object recognition over another manipulation of perceptual
load that can allow us to rule out any strategy-based alternative
accounts for the effects of perceptual load. In this experiment, we
manipulated load using a letter-search task. A circle of six letters
was presented on each of the prime displays together with a
meaningful 3D image of a distracter object at fixation. Subjects
were asked to ignore the distracter object at fixation and search the
letter circle for either of the target letters X or N. We varied the
level of search load through the similarity of the target and
nontarget letters and the heterogeneity of the nontarget letters. In
the low-load condition, all the nontarget letters were O’s. In the
high-load condition, the nontarget letters were K, R, V, S, or L.
This is a well-established manipulation of visual search load (see
Duncan & Humphreys, 1989, for review) that has been used in
many of the previous perceptual load studies (see Lavie, 2005, for
a review).
As before, after the prime response participants were asked to
name the object in a probe display. We measured distracter rec-
ognition through the effects of repetition priming. In a change from
the previous experiments, we varied the level of perceptual load
randomly within the same block. A replication of the load effects
with such a design would allow us to rule out any alternative
accounts in terms of potential strategy differences in the two
conditions of perceptual load. This same approach has been
adopted in several previous studies (Brand-D’Abrescia & Lavie,
2007; Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie
& Fox, 2000; Theeuwes, Kramer, & Belopolsky, 2004), each
successfully ruling out differential strategies as an alternative
explanation of the perceptual load effect. Nevertheless, it seemed
desirable to establish that such alternative accounts cannot explain
the effect of perceptual load on object recognition found here.
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight participants (9 males) aged be-
tween 19 and 42 from the participant pool of the Department of
Psychology, University College London took part for £3 or course
credits. All were native English speakers and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and procedure. The prime display consisted of a cir-
cular array of six letters in the center of the screen surrounding a
color image of an upright common object. The letters were either
one of two targets (X or Z) and five nontargets (five times the letter
“O” in low load an letters K, R, V, S, L in high load). The diameter
of the circular array was 6 cm, and the distracter object appeared
1 cm from the outer edge of the closest letter. The distracter object
was presented at an average size of 4 cm. Participants were placed
at a distance of 60 cm from the screen. The stimuli were color
images of common objects from the Tarr (http://www.tarrlab.org/)
image data bank. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment
1 except for the following changes: The prime display appeared
only briefly for 195 ms (to prevent eye movements); a neutral
letter search task (to find targets X or Z among similar or dissim-
ilar nontargets) instead of an object-naming task was used in the
prime display. The participants saw only one object (the distracter)
in the prime display while performing the letter search task, in
which they were required to press X and Z on a keyboard, and they
performed a different task (naming the object) in the probe display.
The probe object was either the previous distracter object in the
prime display (shown in the same view) or was a new object that
was not presented previously. As in the previous experiments, the
single probe object appeared in the center of the screen (for 195
ms) and had to be named out loud.
Subjects were acquainted with the experiment by gradually
increasing the complexity of the practice trials. Subjects started
with four blocks of 16 practice trials each. In the first block of 16
trials, they looked for targets X and Z under low load without a
distracter object in the prime display and without a probe display
(so that there was no naming task). In the second block, they again
only practiced the letter search task but this time under high load
only. In the third practice block, they performed the letter search
task with low-load and high-load trials intermixed. In the fourth
and final practice block, the full trial sequence was presented and
they performed the letter search task (prime display) followed
immediately by the object naming task (probe display). This was
followed by a block of 72 experimental trials. The factors load
(high vs. low), repetition (repeated vs. unrepeated), and position of
the target letter (6) were fully counterbalanced. The target letters
(Z or X) were randomly assigned to each trial with equal proba-
bility. The whole experiment lasted about 35 min.
Results
Trial pairs with a voice key error (M  9.8%) were excluded
from all analyses in this experiment. One-way within-subject
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ANOVAs were conducted on the correct prime RTs and error rates
with the factor of load (low, high). These ANOVAs showed a main
effect on the prime RTs, F(1, 27)  87, MSE  3,050, p  .001,
and on the prime error rates, F(1, 27)  30.5, MSE  .004, p 
.001. The mean prime RT was 729 ms under low load (SE  27;
M error rate  4%) and 867 ms (SE  32; M error rate  15%)
under high load. Thus, again, load was effectively manipulated in
the target processing of the prime display, with poorer perfor-
mance under high load.
Probe responses. Only response times to probe displays that
followed a correct response to both the prime and probe display
were analyzed. For the RT analysis incorrect probe trials (M 
5%) were excluded as well. Thus, 11.2% of trial-pairs were re-
moved from the RT analysis. As can be seen in Table 3, the mean
baseline RT was 1,028 ms in the low-load condition and 1,018 ms
in the high-load conditions, a nonsignificant difference, t(27)  1.
A two-way within-subject ANOVA on the probe RTs as a
function of repetition (repeated vs. unrepeated) and load (high vs.
low) revealed a main effect for repetition, F(1, 27)  40.2, p 
.001, MSE  16,643, with shorter RTs for repeated objects, and a
main effect for load, F(1, 27)  5.32, p  .05, MSE  6,704, with
shorter RTs in the low-load than in the high-load condition.
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction
between load and repetition, F(1, 27)  5.62, p  .05, MSE 
10,306. The interaction reflected a greater RT facilitation in the
repeated distracter conditions in the low-load compared to the
high-load conditions, t(27)  2.37, p  .05. This modulation of
repetition priming by load is exactly as predicted by the Load
Theory. Because the level of perceptual load was now varied
randomly within blocks, the present load effects cannot be ac-
counted for in terms of a change in strategy.
A Friedman ANOVA on the low error frequencies in the probe
responses revealed no significant difference between the four
conditions, 2(3)  3.45, p  .33; thus, there was no indication of
a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Experiment 4a
Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated that high perceptual load
in the task eliminates any repetition priming effects produced by
distracter objects that are repeated in the same view across dis-
plays. Experiment 4 tested a complimentary prediction regarding
object recognition across changes in the object views under con-
ditions of low perceptual load.
As discussed in the beginning of the article, the hybrid object
recognition theory suggests that unattended objects would not be
recognized if these are repeated in a different viewpoint: view-
invariant recognition requires structural description and forming
such a representation requires attention. Load Theory concurs with
this suggestion as long as recognition is assessed for task-
irrelevant objects that are truly unattended. Recall however that on
the Load Theory the instruction to direct attention to one object
while ignoring another object does not make the to-be-ignored
object truly unattended: in tasks of low perceptual load, the to-be-
ignored distracter object would still receive attention because of
the spillover of any attentional capacity that was left over from the
task-relevant processing. Such spillover of attention should there-
fore allow for a full representation of distracter objects including
their structural description, and this should result in view-invariant
recognition.
Thus, for situations of low perceptual load, the two theories
make contrasting predictions. Based on the general concept of
attention adopted in the hybrid object recognition model, this
model predicts that the to-be-ignored distracter objects would be
recognized only if presented in the same view but not in a different
view (because it assumes that when subjects direct their attention
to one object, the to-be-ignored distracter object is simply unat-
tended, e.g., Stankiewicz et al., 1998). In contrast, the Perceptual
Load Theory predicts that because of spillover of attention in tasks
of low perceptual load the distracter objects would be recognized
even across different views. To test these contrasting predictions,
we presented the distracter objects either in the same-view or in a
mirror-reflected view across the prime and probe displays in the
low perceptual load condition of Experiment 1.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four members from the participant pool
of the Department of Psychology, University of London, were
recruited for the experiment. They were paid £3 to participate. All
were native English speakers, had normal to fully corrected vision,
and were aged between 18 and 37 years.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and procedure in Experi-
ment 4a were the same as in the low-load condition of Experiment
1 except for the following changes. First, black dots (3  3 pixels,
instead of circles) were used as place holders. Second, the stimulus
set used for prime distracters was modified to include only objects
that were asymmetrical along the vertical axis (e.g., objects such as
a snowman or a butterfly were excluded).
There were three distracter repetition conditions: distracter re-
peated in the same view, distracter repeated in a mirror-reflected
view, and distracter not repeated. These conditions were randomly
intermixed between the trials of each block. The nonrepeated
distracter objects were presented facing the same direction in the
prime and probe displays (e.g., a distracter car with its front to the
left on the prime display, followed by a target ant with its head to
the left in the probe display) on half of the trials and the opposite
direction on the other half. The direction of facing for all objects
was counterbalanced across subjects. Each subject was submitted
to 16 example trials followed by two blocks of 36 trials each. The
Table 3
Experiment 3: Mean Response Time (ms), Standard Errors, and
Percentage Errors for Performance in the Probe Displays as a
Function of Perceptual Load and Repetition Conditions
Perceptual load
Repetition condition
DR NR
Low
M 828 1,028
SE 30 33
Percent error 5 6
High
M 909 1,018
SE 35 27
Percent error 4 5
Note. DR  distracter repeated; NR  not repeated.
1353PERCEPTUAL LOAD AND OBJECT RECOGNITION
ordering of the 36 trials in each block (including the pairing of
repeated and unrepeated objects, and conditions of view) was
randomized for each participant. As in the previous experiments, a
particular object appeared in only one trial-pair per participant. Six
clusters of 18 objects each were used for the distracters (two
clusters for repeated conditions and four clusters used in unre-
peated conditions in which distracter and probe objects were
different). These six subsets were counterbalanced across subjects
so that each object appeared in a particular condition (repeated
same view, repeated different view, and unrepeated for same and
different facing condition) equally often as a probe. In addition to
the distracter/probe objects, four clusters of unrepeated objects
were used in prime displays as targets only. Both types of clusters
were counterbalanced across participants such that each object
appeared in each condition equally often.
Results
Trial pairs with a voice key error (M 3%) were excluded from
all analyses. The mean prime RTs was 908 ms (M error rate 
4.5%). Incorrect probe responses (M  6%) were excluded from
the probe RT analysis. Thus, 9.5% of the total trial-pairs were
excluded from analysis. A two-way within-subject ANOVA on the
probe RTs as a function of distracter repetition (repeated vs.
unrepeated) and view (same vs. mirror) revealed a main effect of
repetition: probe target RTs were shorter when the distracter
objects were repeated (M  794 ms) than when they were not
repeated (M  832 ms), F(1, 23)  10.2, p  .01, MSE  3,389.
There was also a main effect of view: target RTs were shorter
when the distracter and target objects were in the same view (M 
801 ms) compared to a different view (M  825 ms), F(1, 23) 
4.4, MSE  3,065,  .05. Critically, there was no interaction
between the factors of repetition and view, F  1. As can be seen
in Table 4, the magnitude of priming was exactly the same for
distracter objects repeated in the same view or in a mirror-reflected
view. Statistical comparisons of the repeated conditions and their
corresponding unrepeated baselines confirmed that the priming
effects were significant for both distracter objects in the same-
view, t(23)  4.09, p  .001, and in the mirror-reflected view,
t(23)  2.39, p  .05. A Friedman ANOVA on error frequencies
for all four conditions was not significant, 2(2)  5.55, p  .136,
thus establishing no speed-accuracy tradeoff.
As predicted from the load hypothesis, distracter objects pro-
duced priming effects regardless of whether they were repeated in
the same view or in a different view. This suggests that spillover
of attention in conditions of low perceptual load allows for view-
invariant recognition of the distracter objects. We note that this
result may appear to be in contrast with the results of one previous
study that has used spatial cuing to manipulate attention. Using a
similar assessment of object recognition through repetition prim-
ing effects on object naming as used here Stankiewicz et al. (1998)
cued attention to one of two objects presented on the left or right
of fixation (each 4° away from fixation) in the prime display. They
found that the uncued objects produced repetition priming only
when they were repeated in the same view but not when repeated
in a mirror-reflected view.
The apparent discrepancy in the results of the two studies may
suggest a profound difference between the effects of cuing on
attention and that of load. For example, one might claim that
spatial attention (as varied with cuing in Stankiewicz et al.’s study)
may specifically affect structural view-invariant representations
whereas perceptual load has more general effects extending to both
holistic view-dependent representations and structural view-
invariant representation. However, the numerous differences in
methodological details between our task and theirs (such as the
greater visual acuity of our distracter objects than Stankiewicz et
al.’s (1998) objects that were presented at more peripheral posi-
tions) preclude a direct comparison of the results in the two
studies. It is for example possible that the combination of reduced
retinal acuity and cuing in Stankiewicz et al.’s study is critical for
the elimination of repetition priming from objects in a different
view. Future studies that compare the effects of load, cuing and
view on object recognition within the same paradigm could shed
light on this point.
Experiment 4b
Experiment 4a showed that under low perceptual load, distracter
objects produced repetition priming even if presented in mirror-
reflected views between the prime and probe displays (c.f., Stank-
iewicz et al., 1998) [Table 4]. However, invariance across mirror
reflection may not indicate full viewpoint invariance. Some view-
selective neurons are tuned to both mirror reflection views of an
object (Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995) and observers often
show invariance across mirror reflection (e.g., Biederman & Coo-
per, 1991; Fiser & Biederman, 2001; Seamon et al., 1997). In
contrast, depth rotations typically show costs in recognition per-
formance (e.g., Thoma & Davidoff, 2006). In Experiment 4b, we
provided a stronger test for our claim that distracter representations
in conditions of low perceptual load include structural descrip-
tions. We presented photo-realistic images of 3D distracter objects
from different viewpoints in 3D space (avoiding a mirror-
reflection change in view). A view-invariant distracter recognition
in this experiment would demonstrate that observers formed struc-
tural representations of these distracter objects.
Method
Participants. Eighteen members aged between 18 and 35
years from the participant pool of the Department of Psychology,
Table 4
Experiment 4a: Mean Response Time (ms), Standard Errors,
and Percentage Errors for Performance in the Probe Displays
as a Function of Target View and Repetition Conditions
View
Repetition condition
DR NR
Same
M 782 820
SE 21 20
Percent error 8 5
Mirror
M 806 844
SE 18 22
Percent error 6 5
Note. DR  distracter repeated; NR  not repeated.
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University College London, were recruited and paid £3. All were
native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and procedure were sim-
ilar to those in the low load condition of Experiment 1 except for
the following changes. First, black dots (3  3 pixels) rather than
circles were used as place holders. Second, instead of drawings
photo-realistic images of 3D objects from different view points in
3D space were used (the Object Databank from Michael Tarr Lab
at Brown University, http://alpha.cog.brown.edu:8200/stimuli/
objects/objectdatabank.zip/view). Specifically, we selected objects
in two different views with the difference ranging from 45° to 135°
to find the most dissimilar views while preserving the critical parts.
We grouped them into view A and view B, with the two different
views of each object counter-balanced between subjects so that
each view served as the prime distracter and probe target equally
often. There were three conditions: the distracter object was either
repeated in the same view as the probe target, or it was repeated as
the probe target in a substantially different view or it was not
repeated. These conditions were randomly intermixed between the
trials of each block.
After 16 practice trials, subjects went through two blocks of 27
trials each. Trials in each block and the pairing of prime target and
prime distracter in each trial were randomized. For each subject, a
particular object appeared only in one trial. There were 72 objects
randomly selected from a total set of 108 objects for each subject.
Six clusters of 18 objects were used for the prime distracters and
probe targets and counterbalanced between subjects so that each
object appeared equally often in the three conditions (repeated in
the same view, in a different view or not repeated). Four clusters
of 18 objects were used for the prime targets, and their selection
was counterbalanced between subjects.
Results
Trial pairs with a voice key error (M 7%) were excluded from
all analyses in this experiment. The mean prime object RT was
1,068 ms, and the mean error rate for prime objects was 17%.
Subjects incorrectly responded to 7% of probe objects. For the RT
analysis, only responses to probe displays that followed a correct
response to a prime display were analyzed. Thus, 23% of trial-
pairs were removed from the RT analysis.
A one-way within-subject ANOVA of the probe RTs revealed a
significant effect of repetition, F(2, 34)  17.2, MSE  154,931,
p  .001 (Table 5). Planned contrasts showed that RTs in the
unrepeated conditions (M  1,050 ms) was significantly longer
than in the repeated same-view condition (M  885 ms) t(17) 
5.04, p  .001, or in the repeated different-view condition (M 
896 ms), t(17)  4.48, p  .001. There was no significant
difference between the repeated same-view or different-view con-
ditions, F  1. A Friedman ANOVA on the probe error frequen-
cies in the three conditions showed no difference between condi-
tions, 2(2)  1, thus establishing no speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Thus, as in Experiment 4a, a task-irrelevant distracter object
produced repetition priming effects irrespective of whether it was
repeated in the same view or in a different (here rotated in depth)
view, in support of our claim that in low-load tasks automatic spill
over of attention allows for recognition of distracter objects across
different views.
Experiment 5
In all of the present experiments, we have used selective atten-
tion task procedures. The participants were explicitly instructed to
ignore the irrelevant distracter, and the distracter object was pre-
sented in an irrelevant position that was clearly separated from the
target position. However, the repetition priming task used in Ex-
periments 1 through 4 may have unwittingly involved an incentive
for the participants to pay attention to the distracters because the
distracter objects were repeated as the probe targets. One may then
argue that the participants in these experiments treated the task as
a divided (rather than selective) attention task. In other words,
participants may have ignored the instruction to ignore the irrele-
vant distracters, attempting to divide their attention between the
relevant objects and the distracter objects whenever possible (i.e.,
under conditions of low but not high perceptual load).
This issue does not influence our present conclusions regarding
the role of attention in object recognition. Specifically, our con-
clusion that object recognition depends on the allocation of
limited-capacity attention, even when objects are repeated in the
same view, holds irrespective of whether a divided or a selective
attention task was used.
However, the resolution to the early versus late selection debate
offered in the Load Theory clearly rests on the assumption that the
participants always treat selective attention tasks as divided atten-
tion tasks, in the sense that they allocate any spare capacity to
task-irrelevant stimuli even when there is no incentive to do so
(because the spillover of attention to irrelevant distracters is in-
voluntary). Thus, in Experiment 5 we sought to examine whether
the effects of perceptual load on object recognition would be found
in a selective attention task in which there is no incentive to pay
attention to the irrelevant distracters. To that purpose, the partic-
ipants in Experiment 5 performed a letter search task and were
instructed to ignore irrelevant distracter objects as before; but in a
change from the previous experiments, the distracters were never
repeated as targets during the attention task. We assessed distracter
object recognition in a surprise recognition test that followed the
selective attention task. In the recognition test, participants were
presented with two objects on each trial and had to indicate which
of the two was presented in the attention task. In Experiment 5a,
we tested the effects of perceptual load on distracter object recog-
nition and in Experiment 5b, we tested the effects of a 3D change
in the viewpoint.
Table 5
Experiment 4b: Mean Response Time (ms), Standard Errors,
and Percentage Errors for Performance in the Probe Displays
as a Function of the Repetition Condition
Variable
Repetition condition
Same view
Different
view
No
Repetition
M 885 896 1,050
SE 34 37 39
Percent error 6 8 7
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Method
Participants. Twelve healthy volunteers (8 males) with an
average age of 24 years (ranged between 20 and 45) were recruited
from the subject pool of the Department of Psychology, University
College London. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion and were given £3 upon taking part in the study.
Stimuli and procedure. Participants were instructed to perform
a letter search task and ignore irrelevant distracter objects that
were presented at fixation. The letter search task stimuli and
procedure were the same as those used in the prime displays in
Experiment 3. Probe displays were no longer included. The dis-
tracter objects presented were selected from the same set of objects
as that used in Experiments 3 and 4b and had the same dimensions.
Following performance of the attention task, participants were
asked to perform a surprise recognition-memory task. Two images
of objects (of the same dimensions as those presented during the
experiment) were presented 2.25° on the left or right of fixation
(measured to the object center), and the participants were asked to
indicate which of these was presented as a distracter in the atten-
tion task (pressing either ‘1’ to indicate the left object or ‘2’ to
indicate the right object). The memory displays remained until the
participants made a response. In Experiment 5a, the distracter
objects were presented in the same view in both the attention task
and memory test. In Experiment 5b, half of the objects were
presented in the same view and the other half in 3D rotated view,
using the same viewpoint changes as in Experiment 4b. No feed-
back was given on performance in the memory test.
In Experiment 5a, each participant completed three practice
blocks of 18 trials: low load, high load and intermixed. No dis-
tracter object was present in these blocks. Practice blocks were
then followed by one experimental block of 48 trials (24 low-load
trials and 24 high-load trials, intermixed in random). In Experi-
ment 5b, each participant completed one practice block of 18 trials
with the search task under low load (but with no distracter object).
This was followed by one experimental block of 48 low-load trials.
Each experiment was followed by a surprise recognition memory
test in which 48 displays were presented (with a distracter object
and a foil in each one).
In both experiments, we counterbalanced object identity and
conditions such that each object was presented as a distracter in
either the low-load or the high-load conditions or as a foil in the
recognition test with equal probability across the different partic-
ipants. Target letter identity (2), position in the attention task (6),
as well as object position in the recognition test (left vs. right) were
counterbalanced in each of the conditions of load.
Results
Experiment 5a. High load in the search task resulted in longer
RT (M  857 ms) and increased error rates (M  79% compared
to the low-load condition (M RT  645 ms; M error rate  94%),
t(11)  7.87, p  .001 for the difference in RT; t(11)  6.31, p 
.001, for the difference in error rates. This confirmed that percep-
tual load was successfully manipulated in this search task.
Trials with an incorrect response in the attention task were
excluded from the analyses of the recognition test performance in
both Experiments 5a and 5b (but inclusion of the incorrect atten-
tion trials did not influence the results pattern or their statistical
significance). As we predicted, the mean percentage correct rec-
ognition rates in the memory test were significantly higher in the
low-load condition (M 65%, SE 3) compared to the high-load
condition (M  50%, SE  3.6), t(11)  3.170, p  .01.
Experiment 5b. The mean RT in the search task was 650 ms
(M error rate 93%), a level of performance comparable with that
in the low-load condition of Experiment 5a. As we predicted, mean
percentage correct recognition rates in the memory test did not
differ for target objects presented in the same view (M  61%,
SE  4.2) compared to objects presented in a different view (M 
60%, SE  3.9), t(11)  0.04, p  .97. Recognition rates were
significantly better than chance both for objects presented in the
same view, t(11)  2.523, p  .05 and for objects presented in a
different view, t(11)  2.806, p  .05.
General Discussion
The present findings demonstrate that distracter object recogni-
tion depends on the level of perceptual load in the task. Distracter
objects that subjects are instructed to ignore were nevertheless
recognized, irrespective of whether these were repeated in the
same or a different view, under conditions of low perceptual load
in the task. High perceptual load, on the other hand, significantly
reduced distracter recognition rates, bringing them to chance levels
(Experiment 5a) and eliminating any repetition priming effects
(Experiments 1–3). Importantly, these load effects were estab-
lished for distracter objects that were repeated in the same view
always (Experiments 1–3, 5a).
These findings suggest that high perceptual load that engages
full capacity in task-relevant processing significantly reduces the
extent to which even view-dependent representations can be
formed for task-irrelevant objects, whereas spillover of attention in
conditions of low perceptual load allows for full view-invariant
representations of the task-irrelevant objects. These findings are
the first to establish a critical role for perceptual load in object
recognition, as assessed either by overt naming (Experiments 1–4)
or by incidental recognition rates (Experiment 5) for a wide range
of meaningful objects that are presented in the same view or in a
different view to that just stored.
The convergence of the present results with results from other
behavioral studies as well as neuroimaging studies on the same
conclusion presents a strong case for the important role that
perceptual load plays in determining object recognition. Specifi-
cally, the load-based modulation observed here of repetition prim-
ing effects for distracter objects repeated in the same view is
consistent with the fMRI results of Yi et al. (2004). Yi et al. found
that high perceptual load reduces the effects of distracter image
repetition on fMR adaptation. This imaging finding is supportive
of our conclusion that high perceptual load reduces view-
dependant representations. This conclusion receives further sup-
port from the previous demonstrations that high perceptual load
significantly reduces various other measures of early rudimentary
object representation. Visual cortex activity related to the presence
(vs. absence) of simple 2D stimuli (e.g., black and white check-
erboards, O’Connor et al., 2002; Schwartz et al., 2005) is reduced
with high perceptual load. The sensitivity of detection either of
stimulus presence (vs. absence, Macdonald & Lavie, 2008) or of a
mere light flicker (Carmel et al., 2007) is also significantly reduced
under high perceptual load. Moreover, the fact that perceptual load
can modulate retinotopic representations in primary visual cortex
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(and the LGN, e.g., O’Connor et al., 2002) even in cases where
these reflect unconscious processing (Bahrami, Rees, & Lavie,
2007) is highly compatible with our conclusion that perceptual
load determines the extent to which early view-dependant repre-
sentations are formed.
With respect to object recognition theory, these findings clearly
challenge the claim that attention is only needed for forming
view-invariant representations, whereas view-dependent represen-
tations are automatic and can be formed in a capacity-free manner
(e.g., Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996). The empirical evidence cited
in support of such a claim was based on negative priming and
repetition priming paradigms that did not vary the level of percep-
tual load and involved a rather low level of perceptual load (with
just one target object, e.g., Tipper, 1985; Stankiewicz et al., 1998).
Lavie and Fox (2000) have since shown that negative priming
effects clearly depend on the level of perceptual load in the prime
task and the present findings suggest that higher perceptual load in
such paradigms would reduce even the view-dependent repetition
priming effects that were found for the distracter objects under low
load.
In addition, our conclusion that subjects form view-invariant
representations for irrelevant distracter objects in tasks with low
perceptual load appears to contradict previous claims made by the
hybrid object recognition model that such representations are not
formed for objects that subjects are instructed to ignore. This
contradiction can however be reconciled once the concept of
attention in the hybrid object recognition model takes into account
the concept of perceptual load. In other words, the present research
emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the relevant task
involves sufficiently high perceptual load to engage full attention
in the attempt to assess the nature of mental representations that
are truly unattended.
In this respect, the present findings also highlight the limited
effect of instruction and intentions to ignore distracters. Although
these did not co-vary with perceptual load, distracter processing
clearly did. The findings that subjects could not ignore the dis-
tracters as long as the task involved low perceptual load suggest
that the mere instruction to ignore distracters cannot prevent their
processing. The present results point instead to the need to con-
sider the level of perceptual load in the task in determining both
neural and mental representations of distracter objects.
Given the clear demonstration that even view-dependent object
recognition is subject to capacity limits, an important challenge for
future research would be to clarify the neural and psychological
sources of these capacity limits. These may be conceived in terms
of temporal limits, so that with a limited exposure duration high
perceptual load results in the relevant task processing taking up all
of the available time window. Alternatively one may suggest that
capacity limits should be conceived in spatial terms, such that high
perceptual load results in a narrower spatial extent of perceptual
processing. The demonstrations that perceptual load can signifi-
cantly modulate distracter processing at fixation in Experiments 3
and 5 (see also Beck & Lavie, 2004; Carmel et al., 2007) make this
spatial account somewhat unlikely. To explain the effects of high
load on processing a distracter at fixation in terms of a narrower
spatial extent, one would have to propose that in the high-load
condition, the spatial distribution of capacity was in a ring-like
shape, accommodating just the letter circle area, to the exclusion of
the fixated area. However, the numerous reports of failures to
distribute attention in a ring-like shape (Eimer, 1999, 2000; Erik-
sen & Yeh, 1985; Heinze et al., 1994; Posner, Snyder, & David-
son, 1980) make it unclear that such distribution of attention is at
all possible.
To directly address accounts of the effects of perceptual load in
terms of either the spatial extent or processing time, one would
need to orthogonally vary perceptual load along with the available
processing time (e.g., through the exposure duration) or the spatial
extent of perceptual processing in the task (e.g., presenting task-
irrelevant stimuli in various distances from the task-relevant stim-
uli). Such experiments should prove illuminating for the under-
standing of the sources of capacity limits in perception.
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